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Does Anātman Rationally Entail Altruism? 
On Bodhicaryāvatāra 8:101-103 
 
Stephen Harris1 
 
Abstract 
In the eighth chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the Buddhist 
philosopher Śāntideva has often been interpreted as offer-
ing an argument that accepting the ultimate nonexistence 
of the self (anātman) rationally entails a commitment to 
altruism, the view that one should care equally for self 
and others. In this essay, I consider reconstructions of 
Śāntideva’s argument by contemporary scholars Paul Wil-
liams, Mark Siderits and John Pettit. I argue that all of 
these various reconfigurations of the argument fail to be 
convincing. This suggests that, for Madhyamaka Budd-
hists, an understanding of anātman does not entail accep-
tance of the Bodhisattva path, but rather is instrumental 
to achieving it. Second, it suggests the possibility that in 
these verses, Śāntideva was offering meditational tech-
niques, rather than making an argument for altruism 
from the premise of anātman. 
 
                                                          
1 Department of Philosophy, University of New Mexico. Email: Sharris4@unm.edu. 
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In the eighth chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the Buddhist philosopher 
Śāntideva has often been interpreted as offering an argument that ac-
cepting the ultimate nonexistence of the self (anātman) rationally entails 
a commitment to altruism, the view that one should care equally for self 
and others. In this essay, I consider Paul Williams’ critique of Śāntideva’s 
argument, and Mark Siderits and John Pettit’s defenses of Śāntideva in 
response to Williams. I argue that Śāntideva’s argument will be more 
plausible if, contra Williams, we do not interpret him as denying the 
conventional existence of the self. Nevertheless, I agree with Williams 
that if we interpret Śāntideva as making an argument that realizing the 
truth of anātman entails altruistic action, we must conclude that the ar-
gument fails. Śāntideva, I argue, finds himself in a dilemma: if too much 
emphasis is placed on the importance of the conventional self, then the 
egoist can claim that his conventional identity with his future self justi-
fies his prioritizing that future self’s welfare. On the other hand, if the 
fictitious nature of this conventional self is emphasized, then it becomes 
open to the opponent to question why we must care about anyone’s wel-
fare in the future, including our own.  
Next, I consider two reconstructions of Śāntideva’s argument, by 
Mark Siderits and John Pettit, and argue that both these reconstructions 
fail to avoid the dilemma identified above. Two conclusions can be 
drawn from this failure to reconstruct a successful argument from 
anātman to altruism. First, it suggests that, for Madhyamaka Buddhists, 
an understanding of anātman does not entail an acceptance of the Bodhi-
sattva path, but rather is instrumental to achieving it. Second, we should 
question whether the interpretation of Śāntideva as making an analytic 
argument for altruism is the correct one. 
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Śāntideva’s Argument and Reconstruction by Paul Williams 
What seems to be the heart of Śāntideva’s argument occurs in chapter 8, 
verses 101-103 of his Bodhicaryāvatāra. Wallace and Wallace translate the 
verses as follows: 
The continuum of consciousness, like a series, and the ag-
gregation of constituents, like an army and such, are un-
real. Since one who experiences suffering does not exist, 
to whom will that suffering belong?  
All sufferings are without an owner, because they are not 
different. They should be warded off simply because they 
are suffering. Why is any restriction made in this case? 
Why should suffering be prevented? Because everyone 
agrees. If it must be warded off, then all of it must be 
warded off; and if not, then this goes for oneself as it does 
for everyone else. (102) 
Śāntideva’s audience, presumably, is a Buddhist who accepts there is no 
self but rejects the characteristic Mahāyāna position that we ought to act 
altruistically. Throughout this essay, I will use “altruism” to refer to the 
position that one should have an impartial concern for one’s own and 
others welfare, and should strive to remove all suffering, regardless to 
whom it belongs.2 Verse 101 points out that since a person is a partite 
entity, accepting that partite entities do not exist entails accepting that 
                                                          
2 Here, we may adopt with minor qualification, one of Jon Wetlesen’s individualistic 
definitions of altruism. An altruistic person “has an impartial concern for the welfare of 
all parties concerned, without discriminating between the welfare of himself or herself 
and others” (41). The necessary qualification is that an altruistic person might still fo-
cus on removing his own suffering in some cases. This is because his concern is to re-
move as much suffering as possible, regardless to whom it belongs. Therefore, since he 
is often in a particularly advantageous position to care for his own welfare, he would 
sometimes focus on this first.  
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persons are fictions. Suffering, if it exists, belongs to no one. Since we 
accept that selves do not exist, and since all suffering is alike in being 
negative, there is no rational reason to prioritize removing my own suf-
fering. Verse 103 draws the conclusion that either we ought to commit 
to remove everyone’s suffering or we ought to accept that it isn’t 
worthwhile to remove any suffering. Because everyone, however, agrees 
that suffering ought to be removed, we ought to commit to altruism.3 
The above is a brief sketch of what seems to be Śāntideva’s gen-
eral strategy. Commentators, however, have differed considerably on 
how to interpret the details. Paul Williams interprets Śāntideva as ar-
guing that the moral imperative to place others’s happiness alongside 
one’s own in importance can be drawn from the ontological fact of the 
nonexistence of the self. Śāntideva then, pace Hume, is attempting to de-
rive an ought from an is (Studies 104). Drawing upon the Tibetan com-
mentarial tradition, Williams interprets Śāntideva’s argument as an ap-
peal to our rationality. Once we understand reality correctly, and accept 
the self is nonexistent, it will no longer be rational to remove one’s pain 
before removing the pain of others (Studies 105).4 
One puzzling feature of Śāntideva’s argument is that it appears to 
depend upon the reductionist thesis that although partite objects like 
selves do not exist, momentary mental sensations like pains do. This is 
odd, since as a Mādhyamika, Śāntideva should hold that nothing has in-
trinsic existence, but that all entities are convenient fictions depending 
                                                          
3 In the conclusion of this essay, I will question whether Śāntideva is really making an 
argument in these passages. Part of my evidence for considering this possibility is that 
no reconstruction of these passages as an argument seems to be successful. Therefore, 
in this and the next section, I provisionally assume he is making an argument and de-
velop what I take to be the most reasonable version of this argument, in order to show 
why it fails.  
4For another version of an argument that realizing the truth of anātman entails altruis-
tic action, see Perrett, “Egoism.”  
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on their causes and conditions and conceptual labeling for their exis-
tence. Although he is not explicit about this, Williams seems to concur 
with Mark Siderits in holding that Śāntideva here is provisionally ac-
cepting an Ābhidharmika position (“Reality,” 421).5 Although 
Ābhidharmikas reject the existence of partite objects, they do accept 
that there are really existing physical and mental events, fundamental 
constituents of the universe called “dharmas.” Pain would be a species of 
sensation (vedanā), one of these mental dharmic events; so pain, for the 
Ābhidharmika, ultimately exists, even though the person does not. 
Śāntideva’s argument, then, would be an example of skillful means 
(upāya) directed toward an Ābhidharmika Buddhist, to show that even 
the ultimately incorrect Ābhidharmika understanding of reality, in 
which pain is an ultimate constituent of reality, entails acceptance of the 
Mahāyāna tenet of altruism.  
Both Ābhidharmika and Madhyamaka Buddhists hold that al-
though everyday entities like tables, chairs, and selves do not exist in-
trinsically, they still have conventional validity as transactional items in 
daily life. The conventional self, then, is not denied; rather it is the false 
conception of a self existing independently of its causes and conditions 
that is rejected. Williams, however, argues that to make sense of 
                                                          
5 For a different interpretation that claims Śāntideva does not argue from an 
Ābhidharmika position, see Wetlesen. I agree with Wetlesen’s view that for most of his 
text, Śāntideva does not argue from an Ābhidharmika position; however, it seems to me 
that Siderits is correct in claiming this particular argument depends on Ābhidharmika 
presuppositions. In the verses quoted above, Śāntideva explicitly refers to sufferings 
that exist without an owner, a possibility that an Ābhidharmika, but not a Mādhyamika, 
would accept. Therefore, if we are to take these passages as an argument from the pre-
mise of anātman to the conclusion of altruism, they are best interpreted as a kind of 
skillful means in which Śāntideva argues from premises his opponent accepts. In gen-
eral, I am sympathetic to Wetlesen’s argument that Śāntideva stresses the interdepen-
dence of sentient beings in this text. Nevertheless, at least the verses under considera-
tion here do not seem to support Wetlesen’s underlying thesis that Śāntideva was ar-
guing for a holistic conception of self, in which one considers the selves of others as 
part of one’s own self.  
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Śāntideva’s argument, he must be seen as denying the reality even of 
this conventional transactional self (Studies 112). This is because accept-
ing the conventional self would allow “all the normal everyday transac-
tional distinctions to be made” (Studies 110). This would allow us, contra 
Śāntideva’s intended conclusion, to prioritize our future conventional 
self over the selves of others. Williams puts the point as follows: 
In order to give precedence to (a) this person over the in-
terests and rights of (b) that person, all I have to do is be 
capable of making a distinction between (a) and (b). This 
distinction can be made in various ways, but in our com-
mon experience it rests on whatever normal everyday dis-
tinctions are indeed made between (a) and (b), between 
me and Archibald. Therefore if there is any difference at 
all between me and Archibald, if we are different persons, 
I can still be selfish. I can still put myself first. (Studies 111)  
Williams, therefore, concludes that for Śāntideva’s argument to work, it 
must be interpreted as an argument against not only an intrinsically ex-
isting self, but also a conventional transactional self. Williams, however, 
points out that this would be a disaster. It is within the everyday transac-
tional realm that conventional selves perform salvific activities (Studies 
164-165). In denying the conventional self, therefore, Śāntideva has de-
stroyed the Bodhisattva path (Studies 174-176).6  
It is true that Śāntideva claims the self does not exist, but he does 
not state explicitly whether only the intrinsically existing self, or both 
this self and conventional transactional self, is being denied. Since, as 
Williams points out, the results of denying not only the intrinsically ex-
isting, but also the conventional self would be disastrous, this view 
should not be attributed to Śāntideva unless we have strong reason to 
                                                          
6 Cf. Clayton 84-86.  
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believe this is what he meant. In fact, in most of his text, Śāntideva 
makes liberal use of the conventional self, who is being instructed in the 
ways of the bodhisattva.7 It seems, therefore, that this is unlikely to be 
what Śāntideva intended.8  
Williams justifies attributing his interpretation to Śāntideva on 
the grounds that Śāntideva’s argument will not work without it. As long 
as we can make a distinction between my future conventional self, and 
the conventional self of other persons, then it is still possible to priorit-
ize my own welfare. Nevertheless, we need not interpret Śāntideva as 
making the implausible claim that realizing the truth of anātman some-
how makes us no longer able to make distinctions among conventionally 
labeled entities. As Barbra Clayton insightfully points out, Śāntideva’s 
reasoning here parallels traditional anti-discrimination arguments (91). 
Since all beings equally desire happiness, if it is ethical for me to priorit-
ize the welfare of my future self, I ought to be able to point out some re-
levant distinction that justifies this. If my conventionally existing future 
self were ultimately identical to my current self, this would provide the 
relevant distinction. Accepting the truth of anātman, however, means 
accepting the identity of my current and future self is merely a conven-
tion. Therefore, assuming no other relevant distinction can be given, it 
follows that ethically I cannot justify prioritizing my own welfare above 
others; if I am committed to removing suffering, I ought to commit to 
removing all of it.9 
                                                          
7 Evidence for this point can be found by talking almost any verse from the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra at random. Consider, for instance, the first verse of the eighth chapter: 
“Upon developing zeal in that way, one should stabilize the mind in meditative concen-
tration, since a person whose mind is distracted lives between the fangs of mental af-
flictions” (Wallace & Wallace 89). Here, as in numerous verses throughout the text, 
Śāntideva is clearly directing his comments to the conventionally existing self.  
8 Here, I am in agreement with Barbara Clayton (90-91).  
9 In the fifth chapter of his Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Paul Williams 
argues in great detail against the Buddhist claim that partite entities, including per-
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An interpretation of Śāntideva’s argument may be given, there-
fore, that does not attribute to him the implausible thesis that conven-
tional selves do not exist even conventionally. Śāntideva can be seen as 
claiming that although conventional selves exist, when we realize they 
are only convenient fictions we will accept that we should not prioritize 
our own conventional self’s welfare above that of other persons.10 How-
ever, if we emphasize the lack of real identity between present and fu-
ture conventional selves, it becomes open to Śāntideva’s opponent to ask 
why we should care about the welfare of anyone at all, including of our 
future conventional self.11 Since the identity of my present and future 
                                                                                                                                                
sons, exist only as a result of conceptual imputation. The chapter illustrates a masterly 
blend of scholarship rooted in the Indian and Tibetan commentarial tradition, and Wil-
liams’ application of work by contemporary analytic metaphysicians. For my purposes, 
however, I am simply assuming the Buddhist position of anātman is coherent, since my 
own interest is in questioning whether a commitment to altruism would follow from its 
acceptance. See Siderits’s “Reality” for a thoughtful response to Williams’ critique.  
10 Williams elsewhere expresses his point as follows: “I argue on logical grounds that 
the negation of the Ātman will not eliminate selfishness because denying the Ātman is 
compatible with being selfish.” (“Response to Pettit” 147). Here, I think Clayton’s sug-
gestion that we think of Śāntideva as making an antidiscrimination argument is help-
ful. Williams is correct that one could both deny the intrinsic existence of the self and 
be selfish, by prioritizing the welfare of the conventional self. However, the force of 
Śāntideva’s argument would be to claim that such prioritizing would be irrational, in 
that there is no good justification for prioritizing one’s own future welfare, once 
anātman is accepted. 
11 Williams makes a similar point in reference to verses ninety-seven and ninety-eight 
in chapter eight of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, verses that deal with the topic of altruism and 
rebirth. Here, Śāntideva suggests that if I have concern for my own future rebirths, 
which are not identical to my current self, I should likewise be concerned for the wel-
fare of contemporary others. Williams points out that a potential difficulty for 
Śāntideva’s argument is that his opponent might use these observations to suggest we 
need not care about the welfare of our future rebirths, since they are not really identic-
al to me. Williams here stresses the lack of physical and psychological continuity be-
tween my current self and future rebirths as reasons the opponent might use to suggest 
we need not be concerned with their welfare. Williams insightfully points out that in 
these verses Śāntideva and his commentators face a dilemma: “The more they stress 
otherness between this life and future lives, the more they open themselves to the re-
ply that there is no need to concern ourselves with future lives. The more it is argued 
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conventional self is merely a fiction, why should this understanding not 
motivate apathy instead of altruism? 
Śāntideva’s response to this charge comes in verse 8:103: 
Why should suffering be prevented? Because everyone 
agrees. If it must be warded off, then all of it must be 
warded off; and if not, then this goes for oneself as it does 
for everyone else. (Wallace & Wallace 102) 
We need not have a debate on whether suffering is worth removing, 
Śāntideva is claiming, because everyone is in agreement that it ought to 
be. The opponent, however, can respond that most people agree to this 
because they believe their self, and the selves of the ones they care 
about, endure. If the truth of anātman became widely realized, it might 
also be the case that there would no longer be widespread agreement 
that pain needed to be removed. There might be some altruistically 
minded persons who would be inclined to remove future pain, no matter 
who it belongs to; however, there might be others who would simply 
stop caring about their future conventional selves along with the selves 
of others. Here, we should note that in verse 103 Śāntideva gives us a 
choice: either we should commit to eliminating all suffering no matter to 
whom it belongs, or we should stop removing any of it. The opponent 
can ask, what is to stop us from choosing the option of removing no suf-
fering at all? 
                                                                                                                                                
that there is a need to concern ourselves with future lives because it will be us, the less 
grounds there can be for arguing a concern with contemporary others” (Studies 50). 
Williams goes on to suggest that this issue of altruism and rebirth differs from the ques-
tion of whether we should care for our future selves in the same lifetime, because there 
will be considerable physical and psychological continuity between our current and 
future selves in the present lifetime that will be lacking between my current self and 
future reincarnations. See Studies, chapter 2, especially 49-51. Nevertheless, it seems to 
me that a slightly modified version of this dilemma identified by Williams applies also 
to verses 101-103 of chapter eight that are the subject of this essay. I develop this idea 
below.  
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An obvious response to this objection would be to point out that 
close ties of physical and psychological continuity between current and 
future conventional selves motivate caring for their welfare. If Śāntideva 
were to make this response, however, then he would be committed to 
the view that we have a reason that can justify prioritizing the welfare of 
our future conventional self, since our ties to our future conventional 
self are particularly strong. Śāntideva’s argument, then, faces a dilemma. 
If he claims that the conventional endurance of selves provides rational 
motivation for removing future pain, then it would seem that my con-
ventional identification with my future conventional self would be 
enough to rationally motivate my prioritizing its welfare over other 
selves. However, emphasizing the lack of any ultimate identity between 
present and future conventional selves opens the possibility that it is 
perfectly rational not to care about the future at all. Let us refer to this 
as Śāntideva’s dilemma.12 In short, emphasizing the importance of the 
conventional self opens the door to egoism, because my future self is 
conventionally identical to me. However, when we emphasize the ficti-
tious nature of the conventional self, then the danger of nihilism arises, 
for the opponent can object that there is no longer reason to care for the 
                                                          
12 My presentation of Śāntideva’s dilemma is an adaptation of the one Williams himself 
presents. Williams sees Śāntideva as caught in the dilemma of either accepting the exis-
tence of the conventional self, in which case egoism is still possible, or denying the ex-
istence of the conventional self, in which case the idea of removing pain becomes inco-
herent. See “Response to Pettit” 147. I find it both too uncharitable, and too out of 
keeping with the remainder of the text, which frequently refers to conventional selves, 
to interpret Śāntideva as denying the existence of the conventional self. Instead, I sug-
gest that he accepts the existence of the conventional self, but argues that given its lack 
of intrinsic identity in any ultimate sense with my future conventional self, the exis-
tence of the conventional self does not provide rational grounds for prioritizing my 
own welfare. This leads to the dilemma I call “Śāntideva’s dilemma”: Emphasizing the 
lack of identity between my present and future conventional selves raises the question 
of why I should care for the welfare of any future conventional self, including my own. 
Emphasizing the importance of the relationship between my present and future con-
ventional self, on the other hand, offers a reason to prioritize my own welfare.  
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suffering of anyone.13 Rather than entailing altruism, Śāntideva’s argu-
ment ends up providing a justification for total apathy. 
Reconstruction by Mark Siderits  
We have seen that there is a dilemma involved in reconstructing these 
passages as an argument that anātman entails altruism. On the one hand, 
emphasizing the ultimate nonexistence of the self leads us to doubt 
whether we are obligated to eliminate any suffering whatsoever. On the 
other hand, emphasizing the importance of conventionally existing 
selves leads us to prioritize the welfare of our future conventional selves, 
which are conventionally identical to our current selves.  
However, this dilemma relies upon a hidden assumption: we are 
only obligated to remove pain if there are selves to experience this pain. 
Mark Siderits interprets Śāntideva as rejecting this assumption. He re-
constructs a key portion of Śāntideva’s argument as follows: 
The person, being an aggregate, is ultimately unreal. 
Hence if pain is ultimately real, it must be ownerless or 
impersonal. It is universally agreed that pain is bad (“to be 
prevented”), although this agreement is typically re-
stricted to one's own case. Either pain is ultimately and 
                                                          
13 There are obvious parallels between Śāntideva’s argument, and Derek Parfit’s work 
on the moral implications of accepting the truth of reductionism about personal identi-
ty, the view that “a person’s identity over time just consists in the holding of certain 
more particular facts” that can be “described in an impersonal way” (210). Parfit himself 
considers the question of whether accepting the truth of reductionism might entail we 
would have either no reason to be concerned about our own future, or, given that there 
would remain a great deal of psychological connectedness between different stages of 
our lives, “special” concern for our future welfare might still be justified. Interestingly, 
Parfit claims that both of these views are defensible, and is agnostic as to whether ei-
ther ought to be accepted. See Parfit 307-312. See Perrett (”Personal,” especially 381) 
for an interesting discussion of the Mādhyamaka view of personal identity that also 
considers the relationship between this view and altruistic action.  
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impersonally bad, or no pain (including what is conven-
tionally one's own) is ultimately bad. But it is absurd that 
no pain should be ultimately bad. Therefore pain is ulti-
mately and impersonally bad. (Personal 103) 
While Buddhists hold that persons are ultimately unreal, at least some 
Buddhists hold that pain is ultimately real.14 Since persons are unreal, 
this truly existing pain must be impersonal. There are now two possibili-
ties. Either this impersonal pain is bad, and should be removed; or it is 
not bad, and need not be removed. Since there is common agreement 
that pain is bad, this point is not in dispute. Therefore, pain, which exists 
impersonally, ought to be removed. 
In Siderits’ interpretation, it is now a short step to the conclusion 
that we ought to make an equal commitment to removing the pain of 
everyone (altruism). It is our commitment to removing this pain, which 
ultimately exists impersonally, that leads to us adopting personhood 
conventions in which we identify our current and future collection of 
causal constituents as being the same person. Such a convention aids in 
removing pain. For instance, my current set of causally connected con-
stituents are in a particularly advantageous position to prevent the pain 
of gingivitis from arising in my future causal continuum (Personal 103).15  
In Siderits’ view, the Buddhist holds that we conventionally iden-
tify ourselves as enduring persons solely as a stratagem for removing as 
much of this ultimately impersonal pain as possible. Very often the best 
stratagem to removing as much pain as possible is to pay particular at-
tention to our future welfare, since the close causal connections between 
our current and future conventional selves allow us to have a particular-
ly strong effect on its welfare. However, we should keep in mind that the 
                                                          
14 As explained above, Śāntideva appears to be arguing from the perspective of an 
Ābhidharmika, who holds that pains are among the ultimate constituents of existence.  
15 See also Siderits “Reality,” 415.  
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personhood convention is merely a useful fiction adopted for maximal 
efficiency in removing pain. For this reason, there is no reason to give 
any precedence to our own happiness, unless doing so maximizes re-
moval of pain overall. In cases where sacrificing my own happiness 
would result in a greater decrease overall in suffering, I should do that 
instead (Personal 103).16 In other words, I should adopt a commitment to 
altruism, and commit to removing the suffering of everyone in as quick a 
manner as possible, regardless of its owner. 
We could reconstruct the essence of Siderits’s argument as fol-
lows: 
1. Persons do not exist ultimately. 
2. Pain does exist ultimately. 
Conclusion 1: Therefore, pain must exist impersonally. 
3. We should remove this impersonally existing pain, since it is bad.  
4. Since persons exist only as a useful fiction to maximize removal 
of pain, we have no reason to prioritize removing our own pain. 
Conclusion 2: We ought to act altruistically, that is, we 
ought to remove all pain as quickly as possible, regardless 
of its owner.17 
There are two potential problems with this argument. First, as Williams 
points out, it is not clear a Buddhist would accept the antecedent of 
premise 4 (“Response to Siderits” 437). Buddhists hold that we identify 
ourselves as enduring persons due to the influence of beginningless ig-
norance, and rather than helping remove pain, this very identification 
                                                          
16 See also Siderits “Reality,” 415-416. 
17 For a slightly different presentation, see Buddhism 82.  
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causes a great deal of suffering. A Buddhist, then, might claim that ra-
ther than being a useful stratagem for reducing pain, identifying our-
selves as persons conditions the existence of any suffering whatsoever.  
To this objection, the Buddhist can reply that suffering arises on-
ly as a result of misidentifying the series of mental and physical mo-
ments (skhandas) as an enduring person (ātman). So long as one recog-
nizes “person” is only a convenient designation (prajñapti) for the series, 
however, no clinging toward a person arises, and suffering does not re-
sult.18 Siderits clearly intends only this conventional designation of per-
son to be adopted for pragmatic purposes, so it is no longer clear his ac-
count departs from Buddhist orthodoxy.  
Second, Śāntideva’s opponent can respond that insufficient de-
fense has been given to premise three. At first glance, this premise seems 
unobjectionable. People generally accept that pain and suffering are 
negative and, all things being equal, ought to be removed no matter to 
whom they belong. Here, there are two arguments the opponent may 
make in response to Śāntideva. Both responses attempt to use 
Śāntideva’s invocation of anātman against him.  
In the first, the opponent might claim that pain, impersonally 
conceived, is not really negative; it is only because we falsely identify 
ourselves as enduring selves that pain becomes suffering. Plausibly, a 
distinction can be made between pain, which can be conceived of as a 
neutral experience, and suffering, which is inherently negative. Consider 
the experience of running a marathon. For most of us, the feeling of ex-
haustion experienced while running would be one of great suffering; yet 
for some athletes, the same set of sensations might be relished as 
integral to the satisfying experience of pushing one’s body to its furthest 
limit. Similarly, persons have different levels of pain tolerance; sensa-
                                                          
18 See here Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam 9:1, 1313. 
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tions one person might find distressing another may find inconsequen-
tial. From these examples, the opponent might draw the conclusion that 
it is only sensations of pain that are interpreted as negative that are ex-
perienced as suffering. He could then conclude that, if it is only these 
painful sensations that are ultimately real, and pain is not of itself nega-
tive, pain need not be removed. Suffering, further, would be unreal, so 
no effort needs to be made to eliminate it. 
Such an argument might not be convincing for several reasons. 
First, it might be claimed that certain experiences of the sensation of 
pain are inherently negative—for instance, the excruciating pain of a 
dentist performing a root canal without any kind of anesthetic. Likewise, 
even if all physical pain only becomes suffering when interpreted as neg-
ative, it seems that mental pain is intrinsically negative. It is hard to see 
how Śāntideva’s opponent could claim that a moment of deep depres-
sion, of itself, is a neutral experience that becomes suffering only when 
interpreted in a certain way. Yet Ābhidharmika Buddhists recognize 
mental factors such as a moment of depression as dharmas that have ul-
timate existence. Therefore, plausibly, Śāntideva might respond that at 
least some painful experiences are intrinsically negative, and therefore 
provide some reason to be removed. 
Let us assume with Śāntideva, then, that there are some mental 
states that are intrinsically negative, regardless of whether or not they 
belong to persons, and turn to the second hypothetical objection. Here, 
the opponent can question whether the existence of these negative men-
tal states entails the ethical conclusion that we ought to prevent or re-
move them.19 In verse 8:102, Śāntideva claims we should remove suffer-
                                                          
19 We have already seen that Paul Williams reconstructs Śāntideva’s argument as an 
attempt to bridge the is ought gap from the fact of anātman to the normative conclusion 
of altruism. Appealing to the intrinsic negativity of mental states of suffering simply 
shifts the attempt to bridge this gap from the fact of anātman to the fact of suffering 
(duḥkha). Here, the fact of intrinsically negative states is appealed to in drawing the 
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ing simply because it has the nature of being suffering. The phenomenal 
feel of suffering is negative and as such it is to be removed. Nevertheless, 
the opponent may object that simply pointing out the fact that a mental 
state is negative does not obviously entail the normative conclusion that 
we ought to prevent or remove it. Of course, generally we are motivated 
to remove these negative mental states in ourselves, those we love, and 
even strangers, but arguably this may be the case only because we falsely 
believe ourselves and others to be enduring persons. Once anātman is 
accepted, it is no longer clear why we should automatically transition 
from the fact that suffering exists to the normative conclusion that we 
ought to remove it. The opponent, here, need not make the stronger 
claim that it is irrational to remove suffering; rather, all he or she needs 
to do is to claim that accepting anātman makes it no longer clear why we 
are ethically obligated to remove anyone’s suffering.  
Śāntideva anticipates this response, and in the following verse he 
appeals to commonly held intuitions to shift the burden of proof to his 
opponent. “Why should suffering be prevented? Because everyone 
agrees” (Wallace & Wallace 102). We need not have a discussion about 
whether suffering needs to be removed, he is claiming, because there is 
very little disagreement on the matter. If the opponent wants to dispute 
this claim, since he is going against common opinion, it is he who owes 
an argument as to why we are not ethically required to remove suffer-
ing.  
Śāntideva, then, appeals to common ethical intuitions to support 
his position that suffering ought to be removed. Here, however, we need 
to remember that common intuitions support not only the claim that we 
                                                                                                                                                
normative conclusion that we ought to prevent or remove these states of suffering. As 
will become apparent, it remains unclear that the gap can be bridged, at least simply by 
appealing to the intrinsic negativity of suffering.  
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ought to remove suffering, but also the claim that it is ethically allowa-
ble to prioritize one’s own happiness over the happiness of other per-
sons. There are, then, two principles supported by commonplace ethical 
intuitions that are relevant to Śāntideva’s argument. Let us call them, 
respectively, the “Principle of Moderate Benevolence” and the “Principle 
of Moderate Egoism.”  
Principle of Moderate Benevolence (PMB): Provided it 
would not be overly demanding, we ought to remove suf-
fering, no matter to whom it belongs. 
Principe of Moderate Egoism (PME): It is not immoral to 
prioritize our own welfare above that of other persons. 
There is no obvious conflict in accepting both these principles, and in-
deed commonplace ethical intuitions seem to support the acceptance of 
both. Most people hold both that we ought to care about the suffering of 
others, and that there is nothing unethical about giving somewhat 
greater priority to our own welfare. In his argument, Śāntideva invokes 
the principle of anātman to undercut the ethical intuitions supporting 
PME. Śāntideva argues that since there are no enduring selves, it would 
be irrational, and therefore unjustifiable, to prioritize the welfare of my 
own enduring self above the welfare of other persons. The opponent, 
however, may claim that the invocation of anātman also undercuts the 
intuitions supporting PMB. It is at least plausible that the common belief 
that we should remove suffering is also bound up with the belief that 
suffering belongs to enduring beings.  
The opponent, then, claims that accepting anātman may likely 
undercut existing intuitions that suffering should be removed. The ob-
jection will not work if our intuitions support the conclusion that imper-
sonal suffering should be removed. However, it is not clear that we have 
any intuitions about impersonal suffering. Consider a world where suf-
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fering exists in isolated mental flashes completely disconnected from 
any other mental events. Do our intuitions support the conclusion that 
we ought to remove the suffering in this world? As far as I can tell, I have 
no intuitions about this world. Although I grant its logical possibility, it 
is not clear to me that I have any ethical obligations toward it.20 Presum-
ably, commonplace ethical intuitions hold that the suffering of persons, 
all things being equal, ought to be prevented. It is not clear, however, 
that these same intuitions can be transferred to support the conclusion 
that momentary instances of impersonal suffering also ought to be pre-
vented. 
The opponent’s charge, in brief, is that if anātman is invoked to 
undercut ethical intuitions, then it is unfair to simply cherry pick which 
ethical intuitions will be undercut, and which will remain intact. Of 
course, this is not an argument that PMB is incorrect. Rather, what is re-
ally at issue is the question of burden of proof. Śāntideva has shifted the 
burden of proof to his opponent by pointing out that there is common 
acceptance that suffering ought to be removed. The opponent, however, 
may respond that once anātman has been accepted, it is irrational to ac-
cept any intuitions that arise in dependence on the belief in enduring 
persons. Further, it seems likely that existing intuitions that suffering 
                                                          
20 Of course, this is not a Buddhist world. In a Buddhist world, flashes of mental suffer-
ing are closely connected to other physical and mental events in such a way that the 
suffering of one mental flash can influence and be recognized by closely associated 
mental moments of mind. One might claim, then, that such connected mental states of 
suffering, though belonging ultimately to no one, ought to be prevented, and that our 
intuitions support this conclusion. Here, however, Śāntideva’s dilemma reappears. If I 
emphasize the connections between these mental states as having normative signific-
ance, then I must also acknowledge that my present moment of mind is situated in one 
of these distinct causal streams of mental moments. Therefore, since my current mo-
ment of consciousness is situated within a distinct casual stream, it seems rational for 
me to prioritize the prevention of suffering most closely connected to my present mo-
ment of consciousness. Only the Principle of Moderate Benevolence, and not altruism, 
follows.  
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ought to be removed are dependent on the belief in enduring persons. 
Therefore, the burden of proof is returned to Śāntideva, and we are owed 
a new argument for why impersonal suffering ought to be prevented.21  
Of course, such an argument for removing suffering could be fa-
shioned by appealing to the importance of facts that are conventionally 
labeled “persons,” such as close causal connections and continuity of 
consciousness. Emphasizing the normative value of such impersonal 
facts, however, brings to light the other horn of Śāntideva’s dilemma. 
Since my current moment of mind is located in one such closely related 
stream of mental and physical events, it would seem that I have a good 
reason to prioritize the welfare of those moments of mind most closely 
related to my current moment of mind. Emphasizing the normative sig-
nificance of the conventional person provides a justification for mod-
erate egoism, even if we understand such persons are ultimately reduci-
ble to impersonal facts.  
Our discussion thus far allows us to now state more clearly what 
lies behind this dilemma. Ordinarily, ethical arguments incorporate 
premises based upon commonly accepted intuitions. Śāntideva himself 
does this by arguing that we ought to remove suffering, giving as a rea-
son everyone’s agreement that it should be removed. In other words, it is 
simply an ethical intuition that suffering is bad and ought to be gotten 
rid of when possible. However, Śāntideva also uses a premise, anātman, 
which is counterintuitive, and if true, might undercut many of our basic 
ethical intuitions. Indeed, he uses anātman to argue that the commonly 
accepted intuition that we are justified in prioritizing our own welfare is 
false. The difficulty is that, as we have just seen, accepting the truth of 
                                                          
21 A third argument Śāntideva’s opponent might make is the one raised by Williams, 
that the notion of pains existing without a subject is incoherent. See Williams Studies 
147-164, and the reply by Siderits (“Reality” 418-421) for considerations of this objec-
tion. For a different response to the issue of free-floating pains, see Clayton 86. For the 
sake of argument, I assume that pains may be free-floating.  
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anātman also throws into question ethical intuitions Śāntideva wants to 
appeal to in arguing that we ought to remove suffering. 22 
The underlying cause of the difficulty faced by Śāntideva’s argu-
ment, then, seems to be his incorporation of premises taken from the 
levels of both conventional and ultimate truth. Ethical intuitions that 
support the limited egoistic position that we are justified in prioritizing 
our own welfare, as well as the position of limited benevolence that says 
we ought to have at least some concern for the welfare of others, most 
plausibly arise in dependence on conventional truth and its pragmatic 
employment of personhood. It is less clear that if we eliminated persons 
from our conception of the world, that any obligation to remove any suf-
fering would be intuitively recognized. On the other hand, Śāntideva ap-
peals to the Ābhidharmika understanding of the way things ultimately 
exist by incorporating the truth of anātman into his argument. By 
switching between these levels, Śāntideva is able to both argue that we 
ought to honor our intuitions that suffering should be removed (level of 
conventions) and also argue that since selves do not exist, it would be 
irrational to prioritize our own welfare (level of ultimate truth).  
What I have called “Śāntideva’s dilemma,” in turn, may be seen as 
a way of reminding Śāntideva of the baggage that comes with arguing 
from one level or the other. If one argues from the level of ultimate 
                                                          
22 This, I think, also serves as a response to Barbra Clayton’s reconstruction of 
Śāntideva’s argument. As I have above, Clayton takes Śāntideva to be arguing that, giv-
en the lack of an intrinsically existing self, I have no rational reason to justify prioritiz-
ing removing my own pain above others. Clayton then suggests Śāntideva holds it is 
simply the nature of pains that they are abhorrent, and they should be removed for 
that reason. Here, the opponent could make similar objections to the ones I offered 
above. First, he might claim that, once we deny the intrinsic existence of selves, it be-
comes doubtful as to whether free-floating pains are really abhorrent. Second, he 
might claim that even granted free-floating pains are abhorrent, it is no longer clear 
why we are ethically obligated to eliminate them, given that the commonly accepted 
ethical intuition that pain ought to be removed has been thrown into doubt by the ac-
ceptance of anātman. See Clayton 91.  
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truth, some new justification will be needed for our obligation to remove 
suffering; appealing to intuitions based on conventions will not suffice, 
since these may be undercut by an acceptance of anātman. On the other 
hand, if one argues from the level of conventions, some new justification 
is needed for the obligation to act altruistically, since our ordinary intui-
tions do not support this conclusion.  
Our discussion here raises the intriguing question of to what ex-
tent a Madhyamaka Buddhist’s argumentation should be based in con-
ventional truth, and to what extent he may legitimately draw upon con-
siderations derived from the viewpoint of ultimate reality. For our pur-
poses, we must restrict ourselves to noting that employing premises 
drawn from both levels in a single argument will likely result in friction. 
In this particular case, Śāntideva’s appeal to the ultimate truth of 
anātman results in undermining both the conventionally based intuitions 
he wants to reject, the egoist’s appeal to our common belief that we are 
justified in prioritizing our own welfare, as well as the conventionally 
based intuition that suffering should be removed that he requires to 
complete his argument.  
There are, however, ways of reconstructing Śāntideva’s argument 
that do not obviously depend upon this seemingly illicit switching be-
tween the levels of ultimate and conventional truth. John Pettit, in his 
response to Williams, provides such an interpretation, and it is to this 
that we now turn. 
Reconstruction by John Pettit 
As I have above, in his reply to Williams, Pettit also accuses Williams of 
misidentifying Śāntideva’s object of negation in these verses, although 
his analysis differs from my own. Pettit suggests that Williams takes 
Śāntideva’s object of negation to be the Ātman of Upaniṣadic philosophy 
(132). This is the ultimately existing, independent and self sufficient self 
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that all Buddhists alike deny. Pettit agrees that Śāntideva would deny the 
existence of any such self, but claims his true object of negation is the 
innate conception of self (132). Drawing upon the later Tibetan philoso-
pher Tsong kha pa, he describes this self as the innate sense of “I” that 
arises, for instance, when we are verbally abused. It is this innate self 
grasping which is the source of our conflicting emotions, and would 
therefore be the primary object of Śāntideva’s concern (133). By con-
trast, the conventional self would not be denied by Śāntideva. This con-
ventional self is a convenient fiction, the mere name that is given to the 
continuum of physical and mental events in close association. Such a 
conventional self would not give rise to conflicting emotions, and there-
fore need not be negated. 
Pettit is certainly correct in pointing out that Madhyamaka 
thinkers make a distinction between the self believed in as a result of 
faulty philosophical thinking, here named the Upaniṣadic self, and the 
innate self-clinging common to all unliberated sentient beings. It is not 
clear to me that it is this innate self grasping, rather than the Upaniṣadic 
self, which is the primary object of negation in the verses we have 
looked at. However, it seems plausible that Śāntideva meant to deny the 
existence of both these selves in these verses, and so I will not argue the 
point. 
In any event, Pettit believes that once we identify the innate 
sense of ego grasping as the correct object of negation, then Śāntideva’s 
argument becomes plausible. This is because once innate ego clinging 
has been eliminated, there will no longer be any impediments to putting 
the happiness of others alongside one’s own in importance. 
Given these considerations, Williams’ thesis that ‘the 
ought’ of unselfishness simply does not follow from the 
‘is’ of anātman can be brought seriously into question. If 
one’s rigid sense of separation (via emotional clinging and 
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rejection) from others can be dissolved through demolish-
ing the misconception of a vulnerable emotional self, then 
naturally one’s selfishness, stemming as it does from a 
false belief in that self, will likewise be eliminated. (133)  
Pettit is certainly correct that one of Śāntideva’s primary concerns in the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra is eliminating disturbing afflictions, and the innate 
sense of self grasping which is their root. Further, he is right to point out 
that Śāntideva holds that understanding the truth of anātman has in-
strumental value in eliminating the obstacles to compassionate action. 
Nevertheless, his configuration of Śāntideva’s argument does not bridge 
the is/ought gap; further, eliminating innate ego clinging, in itself, does 
not normatively entail altruistic action, any more than eliminating the 
mistaken belief in the Upaniṣadic self would. 
To see why, we first need to disambiguate what Pettit means 
when he refers to “the ought of unselfishness” that supposedly follows 
from the “is” of anātman. One possibility is that “unselfishness” refers to 
the psychological state of being without ego grasping that results when 
our innate conception of self has been eliminated. This, however, is a de-
scription of a psychological state, and is not itself a normative conclu-
sion. Pointing out that a state of emotional equanimity would result 
from eliminating our innate conception of self does not, of itself, tell us 
what actions we are obligated to perform. In this interpretation, 
Śāntideva would have derived an is (emotional equanimity) from an is 
(lack of self), and a further argument is needed to explain why an emo-
tionally equanimous person ought to act altruistically. 
On the other hand, it is also possible to interpret Pettit as mean-
ing by “unselfishness” the unselfish activity of removing the suffering of 
others. This would be a normative conclusion: once we realize the ab-
sence of any innate self (what is the case), then we must accept that we 
should eliminate the suffering of others (what ought to be the case). Un-
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fortunately, the conclusion does not follow from the premise. It is true 
that if we eliminate the innate sense of self grasping, we will have elimi-
nated the most significant obstacle to the altruistic attitude of putting 
the welfare of others on par with our own. However, this of itself does 
not entail that we ought to remove the suffering of others—only that we 
are able to do so. Removing ego grasping, then, is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for wholly committing to the altruistic path. What is 
still needed is an obligation, or at least a motivation, to care about the 
suffering of any beings whatsoever.23  
Here, we can remember the second horn of Śāntideva’s dilemma 
framed above. Let us say we have negated both the Upaniṣadic concep-
tion of self, and the innate self grasping which is the root of conflicting 
emotions. The emotions of craving and greed no longer act as an impe-
diment to our concern for others, and we have achieved perfect equa-
nimity in regard to self and others. Here, we can remember, Śāntideva 
has presented us with a choice: either all suffering must be eliminated, 
or none of it. Again, we can ask, why should we be required to choose the 
first option? Complete altruism and total apathy are alike in being ap-
parently rational states for an equanimous being to adopt.  
We should conclude, therefore, that pace Pettit, even identifying 
Śāntideva’s object of negation as innate self grasping will not successful-
ly complete an argument that rationally, we ought to act altruistically if 
we accept the truth of anātman. 
                                                          
23 Certain schools of Buddhism believe that our innate nature is compassionate, and so 
hold that merely removing ego clinging will leave us in a state psychologically moti-
vated to remove everyones’s suffering. For these Buddhists, simply accepting that pri-
oritizing one’s own welfare is irrational might be sufficient, since they hold humans by 
nature are intrinsically motivated towards altruism. See Williams’ (Mahāyāna chapter 
five) overview of the Tathāgatagarbha tradition for one example of such a develop-
ment. It is less clear, however, that Madhyamaka Buddhists could successfully employ 
this strategy, since they are antiessentialist, and should therefore reject that there is 
any intrinsic human nature. It seems to me that Madhyamakas in general urge us to-
wards compassionate action, without relying on any essentialist tendencies towards 
altruism.  
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Conclusion: Did Śāntideva Really Provide an Argument for Altruism? 
Above, I have considered two reconstructions of Śāntideva’s purported 
argument that accepting the truth of anātman entails one should act al-
truistically; we have seen that the success of both arguments is doubtful. 
Of course, further reconstructions of Śāntideva’s position might be at-
tempted, and would have to be evaluated on their own merits. Neverthe-
less, these reconstructions would have to find some way of resolving 
Śāntideva’s dilemma identified above. On the one hand, if we emphasize 
the merely imputed and fictitious nature of the conventional self, then it 
will be open to the opponent to inquire why we ought to care about any-
one’s welfare, even that of the future being conventionally identified as 
identical to my present self. In this horn of the dilemma, it becomes un-
clear why understanding the truth of anātman should entail altruism ra-
ther than apathy. On the other hand, we can reestablish a motivation to 
help all sentient beings by emphasizing the importance of the conven-
tional self. However, since my future conventional self is conventionally 
identical to my current conventional self, it would seem that it would 
not be irrational to prioritize its welfare over other conventional selves. 
As I emphasized in my response to Mark Siderits, at the heart of this di-
lemma is a vulnerability to which Śāntideva’s method of argumentation 
opens him. Emphasizing the nonexistence of an enduring self may throw 
into doubt the ethical intuitions the egoist relies on in establishing his 
position that it is rational to prioritize one’s own welfare above others; 
however, it also threatens to undercut ethical intuitions Śāntideva relies 
upon in claiming we ought to care about the welfare of anyone. 
From these considerations, we need not conclude with certainty 
that no argument for altruism using anātman as a premise can be suc-
cessful; perhaps arguments incorporating other Buddhist principles, 
such as the (conventional) joy of benefiting others, or obligation to those 
who have taken care of us in the past, as additional premises might suc-
Harris, Does Anātman Rationally Entail Altruism? 118  
 
ceed. From my observations above, I draw the more conservative conclu-
sion that it seems unlikely any argument for altruism appealing solely to 
the principle of anātman, as well as commonly accepted ethical intui-
tions, is likely to succeed. The verses considered here within Śāntideva’s 
meditation chapter cannot be characterized in isolation as providing a 
successful argument from the premise of anātman to the conclusion that 
we ought to act altruistically.  
There are two remaining questions to explore before bringing my 
own consideration to a close. First, assuming Williams, Siderits, and Pet-
tit were correct in interpreting Śāntideva as providing in these verses an 
analytic argument for the entailment of altruism from anātman, should 
the failure of this argument be troubling to Madhyamaka Buddhists? It 
seems to me that the answer is no. Instead, the failure of Śāntideva’s ar-
gument encourages us to reconsider the relationship between altruism 
and anātman. Rather than conceiving of anātman as rationally entailing 
altruistic action, we should view realization of the truth of anātman as 
instrumental to the foundational Mahāyāna commitment of altruistic 
action. As Pettit forcefully argues, it is only by deeply realizing the non-
existence of any enduring self, and eliminating the deep seated grasping 
that arises from this error, that we are able to give equal priority to the 
welfare of other beings. Realizing anātman, then, is a necessary condition 
for completion of the Bodhisattva path, although it does not of itself 
constitute a reason for entering it. 
Second, since on close examination all configurations of these 
passages as an argument fail to be convincing, we should wonder wheth-
er it is correct to interpret these verses as an analytic argument trying to 
derive the conclusion of altruism from the premise of anātman. The pas-
sages are placed not in the “Wisdom” chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, 
where Śāntideva argues against opponents’ views, but in a chapter de-
tailing various meditations designed to reduce attachment and generate 
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compassion.24 My consideration of these passages as an argument has 
been haunted by a dilemma: either we emphasize the ultimate nonexis-
tence of conventional phenomena like persons, in which case it is un-
clear why we are obligated to remove suffering at all; or we emphasize 
the importance of their conventional existence, in which case it seems 
rational to prioritize our own future happiness, since that self is conven-
tionally identical to us. However, taken as meditational practice, one 
might switch between viewpoints, depending on one’s current mental 
state. If we feel attachment to self arise, we remember that selves are 
nonexistent, and the attachment is lessened. If we feel apathetic toward 
helping sentient beings, then we can focus on their conventional suffer-
ing, and empathy will arise. Such a strategy would make sense if, as I 
have suggested, the bodhisattva has already committed, for independent 
reasons, to removing all suffering equally. 
In fact, in his “Wisdom” chapter, Śāntideva explicitly endorses 
this strategy of switching between meditation on the conventional wel-
fare of beings and their ultimate emptiness as a method of respectively 
nurturing compassion or reducing attachment.  
9:76: [Qualm] If there is no sentient being, whose is the 
task? 
[Mādhyamika:] True. The effort too, is due to delusion. 
Nevertheless, in order to alleviate suffering, delusion with 
regard to one’s task is not averted. (Wallace & Wallace 
124). 
9:77: However, grasping onto the “I,” which is a cause of 
suffering, increases because of the delusion with regard to 
                                                          
24 Siderits also notes the location of these passages is the end of the meditation chapter. 
He continues to interpret them as an argument, suggesting their location explains why 
Śāntideva employed premises he did not ultimately accept. See “Reality” 421. 
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the Self. If this is the unavoidable results of that, medita-
tion on identitylessness is the best. (Wallace & Wallace 
125)  
The first verse suggests that there may be times when taking on the pro-
visional belief in an ultimately nonexistent sentient being will be advan-
tageous because this can allow the arising of compassion toward this (ul-
timately empty) being. Nevertheless, if attachment begins to arise as a 
result of this provisional acceptance of the person, then one should 
switch to meditation on anātman instead. Here we see Śāntideva endors-
ing the general strategy I have suggested; this accounts, I believe, for the 
set of verses appearing in the “Meditation” chapter. 
Additional support for this reading is provided by the identifica-
tion of another set of verses in the Bodhicaryāvatāra in which Śāntideva 
switches between focusing on the conventional existence and the ulti-
mate nonexistence of persons as a method of respectively increasing our 
commitment to developing virtuous states of mind and decreasing our 
negative mental states. These verses are located in Śāntideva’s chapter 
on developing patience: 
6:31: Thus, everything is dependent on something else, 
and even that on which something is dependent is not au-
tonomous. Hence, why would one get angry at things that 
are inactive, like apparitions? (Wallace & Wallace 65) 
In this verse, Śāntideva points out that there is no intrinsically existing 
entity who is the cause of our anger. Rather, selves are conceptual impu-
tations upon causes and conditions, and therefore exist like appari-
tions.25 Here, Śāntideva appeals to the lack of intrinsic existence of per-
                                                          
25 Kunzang Peldon (207) explains that in this verse, Śāntideva is pointing out that there 
are no intrinsically existing agents that are the bearer or recipients of anger. This is 
because hatred arises owing to various causal conditions, which themselves arise due to 
other causal conditions and so on. Therefore, no independent agent who acts as the 
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sons (anātman) as a means of quelling our anger toward them. The strat-
egy parallels his appeal to anātman to eliminate our attachment to priori-
tizing our own welfare in chapter eight, verses 101-103. Śāntideva next 
considers an objection quite similar to the objection made by the oppo-
nent in the eighth chapter who asks, given the nonexistence of persons, 
why suffering should be eliminated at all. 
6:32: [Qualm] Averting anger is inappropriate, for who 
averts what?  
[Response] That is appropriate, because it is a state of de-
pendent origination and is considered to be the cessation 
of suffering. (Wallace & Wallace 65) 
Here, the opponent claims that since anger and the angry person lack 
intrinsic existence, it does not make any sense to talk of eliminating an-
ger. Śāntideva’s reference to dependent origination in his reply indicates 
he is responding from the viewpoint of conventional existence; things do 
exist, conventionally, in dependence upon their causes and conditions. 
Therefore, this conventionally existent anger ought to be removed in 
order to end the conventionally experienced suffering of the conven-
tionally existent person. 
One might here object that Śāntideva cannot have it both ways. If 
the conventional existence of persons, suffering, and anger is enough to 
motivate our removal of this conventionally bad state of affairs, then the 
conventional existence of the person harming us should likewise justify 
our (conventional) anger against that person. Taken as a meditational 
technique, however, this tension dissolves. Śāntideva is not here ontolo-
gizing about the existence of mental states and persons, but rather is 
providing meditational instructions to be used for one already commit-
                                                                                                                                                
creator of anger may be located. For this reason, Śāntideva refers to the bearers and 
recipients of such causally conditioned anger as illusionary. 
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ted to the Bodhisattva path. When anger arises, meditating on the lack of 
intrinsic existence of one’s adversary can be a reliable way to make that 
anger dissipate. If one’s meditation on emptiness begins to corrode one’s 
commitment to creating virtuous states of mind, however, then focusing 
on the conventional existence of persons will reinstate one’s virtuous 
motivation. 
It may be the case, therefore, that no argument in the strict sense 
of a logical entailment of a conclusion from premises was intended in the 
set of verses considered above in the eighth chapter of the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra. Rather, it may be that Śāntideva’s primary intention 
was to provide exactly what the title of his chapter on meditation sug-
gests: effective meditational methods of eliminating egoistic selfishness, 
and nurturing compassion toward others.26 
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